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Abstract 
Pressure on public finances has increased scrutiny of public support for innovation. We examine two 
particular issues. First, there have been many recent calls for the (relatively new) UK R&D subsidy 
to be extended to other “research” activities, such as software. Second, argument still rages about the 
efficacy of direct public spending on R&D via spending on academic research councils, universities, 
and government undertaken work on civil and military R&D. To evaluate these questions we use data 
on market sector productivity, R&D and non-R&D intangible assets, and public sector R&D 
spending. We look for evidence of market sector spillovers from intangible investment and from 
public R&D. We find (a) no evidence of spillover effects from intangible investment at the market 
sector level, including from R&D, (b) strong evidence of market sector spillovers from public R&D 
spend on research councils, and (c) no evidence of market sector spillovers from public spending on 
civil or defence R&D. Our findings tentatively suggest that for maximum market sector productivity 
impact government innovation policy should focus on direct spending on research councils. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the context of the “New Economy” it is often argued that investment in certain types of capital 
could have benefits beyond those firms that make the investment. These production spillovers and 
network effects are most commonly discussed in relation to R&D. Indeed, much innovation policy 
consists of subsidies to R&D, either directly, via spending on R&D in universities or on defence 
projects, or indirectly via an R&D tax credit for private R&D spending.1 
More recently, there has been speculation about possible spillovers from other knowledge 
assets besides R&D, such as ICT (driven in turn by knowledge transfer and/or network externalities). 
For example, there have been active suggestions to extend the R&D tax credit to software.2 At the 
same time, there is also huge interest in the impact of direct public investment in science and 
innovation. For example, spending on research councils was tripled between 1999 and 2007, in 
response to a perceived relatively lower level of such spending in the UK.  
In this paper we attempt to answer two questions. Firstly, are there productivity spillovers from 
intangible investments wider than R&D or do all the benefits of such intangible investment accrue to 
those firms either producing or using intangible capital? Secondly, are there productivity spillovers to 
the market sector from direct public sector spend on R&D and if so what spend (research council, 
civil, defence) is most effective? We believe these questions to be of interest since they shed light on 
the policy question of whether government should provide support for market sector investment in 
innovation, by expanding the R&D tax credit to broad range of intangibles for example, or provide 
direct spending on public R&D e.g. basic research. 
There are of course a number of different ways in which these questions can be approached. 
Our method is in the econometric/growth accounting tradition summarised by, for example Grilliches 
(1992), and implemented in recent econometric work by, for example Stiroh (2002) (for non-R&D 
intangible assets) and Guellec and van Pottelsberge (2004) (for public and private R&D in OECD 
countries).3 To evaluate whether the R&D tax credit should be widened to a broader range of 
intangible assets, we gather data on market sector spending on a broad range of intangible assets 
suggested originally by Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2006). We incorporate them into the UK 
National Accounts and adjust value added to reflect the additional investment in the economy when 
intangible spend is treated as investment rather than, as currently, as an intermediate. We also adjust 
                                                     
 
1 A UK R&D tax credit was introduced in 2000 and the tax credit for SME's was significantly enhanced from 
the 1st August 2008. 
2 In July 2005 a High Court judge ruled that software company BE Studios had claimed £150,000 in R&D tax 
credits in error because the software development work carried out by the company did not seek to achieve a 
scientific or technological advance. 
3 Other approaches are set out in, for example, Salter and Martin (2002) who ask industry participants to rate 
the importance of public research. Mansfield (1981) surveys firm use of basic R&D.  
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inputs and build intangible asset stocks. We calculate resulting TFP growth using growth accounting 
methods that assume no excess of social over private returns. This was done in Giorgio Marrano, 
Haskel and Wallis (2009). We then examine possible spillovers from intangible spending by 
regressing associated stocks of intangible assets on market sector TFP growth.  
To examine possible spillovers from publicly financed R&D to market sector TFP growth we 
then regress TFP growth on various measures of direct public sector R&D spend including research 
councils, block grants to universities for research, civil R&D and defence R&D.  
Despite the policy importance of these questions, there are comparatively few papers that 
study them.4 The part of our work on possible spillovers from a range of intangible assets is very 
similar in spirit to Stiroh (2002). He did not consider a broad range of intangible assets, but looked 
for spillovers from ICT hardware and software, finding, on US data, no evidence (namely that 
measured TFP growth is uncorrelated with all capital inputs, including ICT capital). More recently, 
O’Mahony and Vecchi (2009) investigate knowledge spillovers from R&D, human capital and 
advertising finding evidence of spillovers, but only in certain sectors of the economy. 
Our work on spillovers from public R&D to the market sector is also similar in spirit to that of 
Guellec and van Pottelsberge (2001). As they remark, “…there have been very few studies of the 
effects of public research on productivity”. In similar vein the survey paper by Salter and Martin 
(2002) reports 9 estimates of the rates of return to publicly funded R&D, all of which concern 
agriculture.5 Guellec and van Pottelsberge (2004) construct market sector TFP growth for 16 OECD 
economies and using an error correction model find the (long run) elasticity of public sector R&D 
(measured by R&D preformed in government labs and universities) of 0.17. They also find that this 
impact is positively affected by the share of universities (contrary to government labs) in research 
and negatively affected by the share of defence in public R&D budgets. Note that Park (1995) in his 
international study finds no effect of public R&D once private R&D is controlled for.  
Whilst our methods are not new, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first paper to use 
improved data to examine these issues. This may matter for the following reasons. First, previous 
macroeconomic work that typically regressed the standard measure of TFP growth on R&D did not 
adjust TFP growth for the capitalisation of knowledge assets nor allow for the impact of other 
knowledge assets besides R&D. This potentially affects the measured rates of return due to 
measurement error and omitted variable bias. Second, since other work has not collected data on a 
                                                     
 
4 The majority of studies investigate spillover effects at the industry or firm level and mostly focus on R&D 
intensive sectors. There is much less evidence on the presence and impact of spillovers at the market sector or 
whole economy level; one such is Guellec and van Pottelsberge (2002, 2004). 
5 They are (author, subject and rate of return): Griliches (1958) Hybrid corn 20–40%, Peterson (1967) Poultry 
21–25%, Schmitz-Seckler (1970) Tomato harvester 37–46%, Griliches (1968) Agricultural research 35–40%, 
Evenson (1968) Agricultural research 28–47%, Davis (1979) Agricultural research 37%, Evenson (1979) 
3 
broad range of knowledge assets, it simply does not have the data to examine if subsidies should be 
extended beyond R&D. Third, there are very few papers even using other data sets on this area for 
the UK. 
Our main findings are as follows. First we find no evidence of spillover effects from intangible 
investment, including R&D. Second, we find quite strong evidence of market sector productivity 
benefits from public R&D spend on research councils. Third, find no evidence of market sector 
spillovers from spending on civil or defence R&D. Our findings tentatively suggest that for 
maximum macroeconomic impact government innovation policy should focus on direct spending on 
research councils. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe the data used in our 
empirical analysis and some of its key features. Section 3 outlines the model used in our empirical 
analysis. Our regression analysis is presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the tentative policy 
implications of our empirical findings and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
Agricultural research 45%, Davis and Peterson (1981) Agricultural research 37%, Huffman and Evenson 
(1993) Agricultural research 43–67%. 
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2. INTANGIBLE INVESTMENT AND R&D SPENDING 
This section describes the data used in our empirical analysis and some of its key features.  
2.1. Market sector TFP and spending on intangible assets 
We use data on market sector spending on intangible assets from Giorgio Marrano, Haskel and 
Wallis (2009), which follows the method in Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005,6). We identify three 
main intangible asset classes. Firstly, computerised information (mainly software), secondly, 
innovative property (mainly scientific and non-scientific R&D) and finally firm-specific resources 
(company spending on reputation, human and organisational capital). We also use TFP data and 
capital stocks data from the same study. Figure 1 shows intangible investment as a percentage of 
market sector output. For details see Giorgio Marrano, Haskel and Wallis (2009). 
 
FIGURE 1 
INTANGIBLE INVESTMENT (percentage of output) 
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Source: Giorgio Marrano, Haskel and Wallis (2009) 
Notes: The figure shows the time series for intangible investment for the aggregated categories as a 
share of output. Output is market sector gross value added (GVA) adjusted to include all intangibles. It is a 
cumulative graph so that that top line shows the share of total intangible investment in intangible-adjusted 
market sector GVA. The lowest line shows the share of brand equity and the line above that shows the share of 
brand equity plus the firm-specific resources. Thus the gap between the lines is the share of each category of 
investment. Brand Equity includes advertising and market research. Firm-specific resources includes firm 
specific human capital and organisational structure. Scientific R&D includes scientific R&D and mineral 
exploration. Non-scientific R&D includes copyright and licences costs, new product development costs in the 
financial industry, new architectural and engineering design and R&D in social science and humanities. 
Computerised information is basically software. 
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In section 4.2, where we look at spillovers from public R&D, we start by using TFP from 
Giorgio Marrano, Haskel and Wallis (2009). We then go on to use updated estimates from Haskel et 
al (2009), as this gives us three extra years with which to test our hypothesis of diminishing returns. 
 
2.2 Government spending on R&D 
We use data on government spending on R&D published annually by the Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) as part of science engineering and technology (SET) statistics.6 
The dataset includes full details of publicly funded expenditure on science, engineering and 
technology for the financial years 1986-87 up until 2005-06. In particular, we consider tables 2.1 and 
3.1, entitled “Net government expenditure on SET by departments in cash” and “Net government 
expenditure on R&D by departments in cash”. 
Data is available on expenditure on SET and on R&D. SET is a broad term used to describe all 
publicly funded expenditure on knowledge capital. All SET expenditure is attributed to one of six 
“primary purposes” which are (a) ppA, General support for Research - all basic and applied R&D 
which advances knowledge plus support for postgraduate studentships; (b) ppB, Government services 
- R&D relevant to any aspect of Government service provision (including defence). (c) ppC, Policy 
support – R&D which Government funds to inform policy (excluding ppB & ppD) and for 
monitoring developments of significance for the welfare of the population; (d) ppD, Technology 
support - applied R&D that advances technology underpinning the UK economy (excluding defence, 
but including strategic as well as applied research; and pre-competitive research under schemes such 
as LINK); (e) ppE, Technology transfer - activities that encourage the exploitation of knowledge in a 
different place to its origin and (f) ppF, Taught course awards - includes awards for Masters degrees 
but not for PhDs, which are included in ppA. R&D spending is a subset of SET spending, being the 
sum of expenditure on ppA, ppB, ppC and ppD. R&D is in fact over 95 per cent of SET spending and 
follows almost the same trend, so we use R&D spend here. We also thought it appropriate to exclude 
taught masters degrees.  
Public R&D spend, as well as broken down by these primary purposes, is also broken into 
administrative units, as shown in Figure 2. The classification available is spending on (a) research 
councils, (b) defence, (c) civil and (d) Higher Education Funding Council (HEFC). In 1986, the first 
year of the data, R&D spend was dominated by defence, at over £2bn (at current prices). Civil, at 
                                                     
 
6 All these data are in an extremely useful spreadsheet entitled “SET statistics: science, engineering and 
technology indicators”, reached through a link in the “Related Documents” section of the SET statistics page of 
the website www.dius.gov.uk/science/science_funding/set_stats. We thank Martin Kenchatt from BIS for help 
with these data. The previous draft of this paper used a download in November 2009, this uses an updated sheet 
posted in December 2009. The data are identical aside from the most recent years, which were planned 
spending and are now realised.  
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around £1bn was next, and HEFC and research councils were third and fourth. By the end of the 
period, interestingly, research councils had grown to over £3.5bn, with defence rising somewhat 
HEFC and civil spending also rose steadily.  
There are number of measurement issues here. First, the HEFC is intended to capture the 
notion that some fraction of normal spending on higher education institutions is supposed to support 
research. According to the SET data notes, before 1992, estimates of such spending were based on an 
assumed fraction of time devoted to research applied to the overall higher education spend figure. 
After 1994, this was changed and a new method is now based on a splitting of a university’s 
government income into that for research, that for teaching and other. Research spending is now 
counted as research income and one third of postgraduate teaching income (see notes to the SET 
data). The discontinuity precludes, say the compliers of the data, comparing data past 1993. Whilst 
we shall include this HEFC series, we may be mismeasuring this source of spending and we do not 
measure at all the impact of funded research done by universities in time outside of Research Council 
grants and this allocation of HEFC time.7  
Second, since these date are spending one might worry that there is some double counting with 
private sector spending, if some of that private spending is funded by the government sector. This in 
practice is small.8 In 2007, funding of R&D performed in the private sector was £1.1bn, which is 7 
per cent of the total. Of that, £890m was for defence spending and £168m was civil. Similarly, total 
funding by research councils on R&D was £3.2bn, of which £269m was carried out by business 
enterprise.  
 
 
 
                                                     
 
7 For more on the UK research funding system see e.g. HEFCE (2010). Much of the HEFCE funding in this 
data is quality related (QR) funding, allocated to universities by the RAE. Along with research grant money this 
is known as the dual-support system. As noted in the text, there is also 1/3rd of postgraduate fees counted. We 
should note that we have no data on other research funding for universities from charities and EU grants. In 
2007-8 this accounted for respectively, 15 per cent and 6 per cent of research income at UK Higher Education 
Institutions (HEFCE, 2010, page 15). 
8 See www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/berd0109.pdf for these data. 
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FIGURE 2 
PUBLIC R&D BY ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT  
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Notes: HEFCE (Higher Education Funding Council) spend is that part of university funding designated 
for research purposes. For method of calculation, see text. 
 
International comparisons of such spending broken down at this level are not available, but the 
OECD do publish comparisons of Higher Education Expenditure on R&D (HERD) funding (as a 
proportion of GDP). In terms of the more detailed UK data here, HERD is essentially the sum of 
spending on HEFCE and research councils. Such comparisons are set out in Table 1 where we see 
that in 1986 UK HERD stood at 0.34 per cent of GDP giving a ranking of 9th out of the countries 
show. By 1996 the UK’s rank had dropped to 16th as other countries increased their HERD relative to 
GDP while the UK HERD remained quite stable. By 2006 the UK had regained its rank of 9th (joint 
9th with Norway) as HERD increased to 0.46 per cent of GDP.  
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TABLE 1 
HERD AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES 
Country 1986 Rank 1996 Rank 2006 Rank
Sweden 0.81 1 0.75 1 0.77 1
Canada 0.34 9 0.44 6 0.69 2
Switzerland 0.35 7 0.65 2 0.68 3
Finland 0.34 9 0.46 5 0.65 4
Denmark 0.3 14 0.4 11 0.64 5
Austria 0.42 4 0.53 4 0.59 6
Australia 0.32 12 0.42 8 0.52 7
Netherlands 0.46 3 0.57 3 0.47 8
Norway 0.35 7 0.43 7 0.46 9
United Kingdom 0.34 9 0.36 16 0.46 9
Japan 0.54 2 0.41 9 0.43 11
Belgium 0.29 15 0.38 14 0.42 12
New Zealand 0.17 20 0.4 11 0.41 13
Germany 0.38 5 0.41 9 0.41 13
France 0.32 12 0.38 14 0.4 15
Total OECD 0.29 15 0.34 17 0.39 16
United States 0.26 17 0.31 18 0.36 17
Ireland 0.18 19 0.26 19 0.34 18
Italy 0.22 18 0.26 19 0.34 18
Spain 0.11 21 0.26 19 0.33 20
Korea n/a - 0.23 22 0.32 21
Portugal 0.11 21 0.22 24 0.32 21
Turkey n/a - 0.21 25 0.3 23
Greece 0.05 23 0.23 22 0.27 24
Japan 0.36 6 0.39 13 0.26 25  
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators, 2009. 
Notes: Countries are ordered by their 2006 rank. Data for the years shown is missing for some countries. 
To ensure a consistent UK ranking over time and on a decent panel of countries when there is a missing year 
the following year is taken. If this is also not available the previous year is taken. Countries where neither was 
available have been dropped. 
 
 
We can further analyse the four broad spending categories. Since the research councils will be 
a particular focus Table 2 shows the distribution of spending between different research councils for 
particular years. The final three columns show that the largest shares of spend go to “science”; that is 
medical and engineering based research councils. So for example, in 2005-6, 20 per cent of spend 
went to the EPSRC (Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council), 18 per cent to the OSI 
(essentially the Royal Society), 15 per cent to the MRC (Medical Research Council), 13 per cent to 
the Natural Environment Research Council and 12 per cent to BBSRC (the Biotechnology and 
Biological Sciences Research Council) and 12 per cent to the PPARC (Particle Physics and 
Astronomy Research Council), a grand total of 82 per cent.  
 
9 
TABLE 2 
GOVERNMENT R&D SPENDING BY RESEARCH COUNCIL 
Science Budget 1995-96 2000-01 2005-06 1995-96 2000-01 2005-06
£m £m £m % of total % of total % of total
  OSI - DTI 25 73 503 2.0 5.0 18.2
BBSRC 173 211 320 14.0 14.4 11.6
ESRC 55 64 116 4.5 4.4 4.2
MRC 275 315 416 22.2 21.6 15.1
NERC 156 170 363 12.6 11.6 13.1
EPSRC 345 395 553 27.8 27.1 20.0
PPARC 202 205 334 16.3 14.0 12.1
CCLRC - 2 84 0.0 0.1 3.0
AHRC - - 58 0.0 0.0 2.1
Pensions/Other 8 24 15 0.6 1.7 0.5
TOTAL 1,239 1,459 2,763 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Source: BIS SET statistics, table 3.1 
Notes: CCLRC is Council for the Central Laboratory of the Research Councils. The data for OSI-DTI 
are as follows: OSI expenditure is mostly in support of the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of 
Engineering, which before 1992-93 had been included in DFE (now DES), and includes over the CSR, SR2000 
and SR2002 plan periods the funds for Joint Infrastructure Fund, Science Research Investment Fund, CCLRC 
for Diamond, OSI Initiatives, Foresight LINK Awards and other science programmes not yet allocated to the 
Research Councils. Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC): Biotechnology and Biological Sciences 
Research Council (BBSRC): Council for the Central Laboratory of the Research Councils (CCLRC): 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC): Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC): Medical Research Council (MRC): Natural Environment Research Council (Nerc); Particle Physics 
and Astronomy Research Council (PPARC). 
 
We turn now to civil and defence R&D spending. The provided data (not shown here for 
space) reveals that in 2005/06, over 36 per cent of total civil and defence R&D spending went to the 
Department of Health (DH) (of which most is the National Health Service), over 15 per cent to DFID 
and just under 12 per cent to DEFRA. How might that affect our results? The majority of health 
sector output is non-market sector and that bit that is part of the market sector is thought to be poorly 
measured. Output of agriculture is in our data, but as land is not measured in the UK National 
Accounts as a productive factor TFP growth is likely poorly estimated in our data for agriculture. We 
can assume that most DFID spending goes abroad. Thus around 63 per cent of civil spending likely 
goes to sectors that are not directly measured in our data.  
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2.3. Some simple analysis: the relation between private and public R&D 
Figure 3 shows the relation between private R&D and public R&D spend, which appears to be 
positive. This appears to support the findings in David, Hall and Toole (2000), who tentatively 
conclude that public R&D is a complement to private sector R&D rather than a substitute, see also 
Salter et al (2000). 
 
FIGURE 3 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC R&D SPEND 
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Source: BIS, SET statistics, Table 3.1 and Business Enterprise R&D survey (BERD). 
 
2.4. Some simple analysis: the relation between public R&D and market sector TFP growth 
Figure 4 sets out the relation between research council spend (as a proportion of GDP) and 
TFP growth (where TFP growth is smoothed by a three year centred moving average). As the picture 
shows, research council spend rose in the late 1980s and early 1990s, fell in the mid 1990s and then 
rose strongly from the late 1990s onwards. TFP growth rose in the early 1990s, fell back in the mid 
1990s, rose again until 2004 before slowing down in the last few years of our sample. It is interesting 
to note the turning points of the relationship. The initial rise in spend was in 1988, and the rise in TFP 
growth was in 1990. The fall in spend was then in 1993 and the fall in TFP growth in 1994. Finally 
the rise in spend was in 1999 and the rise in TFP growth was in 2000. A cross plot is shown in Figure 
5. 
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FIGURE 4 
MARKET SECTOR TFP GROWTH AND RESEARCH COUNCIL SPENDING 
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FIGURE 5 
SMOOTHED MARKET SECTOR TFP GROWTH AND RESEARCH COUNCIL SPENDING 
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Notes: spending is as a proportion of market sector value added, lagged one year.. 
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Figure 5 includes a simple fitted value line. This shows an upward sloping relationship 
between research council spending and TFP growth. This is the correlation that we investigate more 
formally below. There are of course a number of issues that we shall have to explore such as other 
factors, reverse causation etc. but before doing this we show the other data by showing the cross plots 
with the other spending categories, HEFC, civil and defence R&D. As can be seen from Figure 6 the 
relationship is much less clear and for civil and defence R&D the line of best fit is actually slightly 
downwards sloping. 
 
FIGURE 6 
SMOOTHED MARKET SECTOR TFP GROWTH AND PUBLIC R&D 
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Notes: spending is as a proportion of market sector value added, lagged one year. 
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3. MODEL 
3.1. Model 
Consider the following model;  
 
 ( , , , )PRIV PUBt t t t t tY A F L K N N=  (1) 
 
where tY , tL  and tK  are output, labour input and tangible capital input respectively. 
PRIV
tN  is 
intangible capital. PUBtN  is freely available public R&D, so it has an output elasticity but cannot be 
seen in factor prices. It might include knowledge elsewhere in the world. tA is any increase in output 
not accounted for by the increase in the factors of production (in this case labour, tangible capital, 
intangible capital and the stock of public R&D).  
Denoting ε as an output elasticity we can write, for, say a translog form of (1)  
 
 
, ,
ln ln ln lnPUB
PRIV
PUB
t t X tN
X L K N
Y A X Nε ε
=
Δ = Δ + Δ + Δ∑  (2) 
where X denotes the first three inputs in F in (1). To convert this into something estimable we then 
make the following assumptions. First,  
 
 ln t o tA a vΔ = +  (3) 
 
where v is an iid error. Second, we assume the ε terms are factor shares plus a term to account for 
either deviations from perfect competition or spillovers due to that factor 
 
 X X Xs d Xε = + ∀  (4) 
where sX is the share in Y of spending on factor X. Third, observed TFP growth is defined as  
 
 
, ,
ln ln ln
PRIV
t t X
X L K N
TFP Y s X
=
Δ ≡ Δ − Δ∑  (5) 
 
Fourth, turning to the εNPUBΔlnNPUB term in (2). Consider εNPUB. If public knowledge is freely 
available, εNPUB>0, but cannot be seen in factor share. Thus we must determine it econometrically in 
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this framework or by case studies. Our main assumption is that ΔlnNPUB is driven by public sector 
R&D i.e. knowledge made publicly available by the public sector. At a zero depreciation rate of such 
knowledge it is standard to write εΔlnNPUB =α(RPUB/Y)t-1 where α is the rate of return on such 
knowledge spend, RPUB public sector spending on R&D, Y is GDP and it is conventional to lag this 
ratio. In addition, ΔlnNPUB might include knowledge elsewhere in the world, knowledge on the 
internet etc, all of which we capture in Z. Thus we write  
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Which has the following intuition. Measured TFP growth will be driven by freely available 
knowledge, summarised in the first two terms, the influence of spillovers or departures from perfect 
competition, in the penultimate term, plus any residual mismeasurement captured here by vt. With a 
limited number of observations our central empirical exercise is to test for spillovers and network 
effects from intangible capital and then to look for market sector productivity benefits from the 
public stock of knowledge. 
It is worth noting the different interpretations of the right hand side depending whether ΔlnTFP 
includes intangibles or not. To interpret dX as excess returns requires computing ΔlnTFP with 
intangibles. To the best of our knowledge this has not been done. Much of the literature on R&D 
excludes capitalised R&D from ΔlnTFP, in which case dR&D is of course both the private and social 
returns to R&D, as that literature notes.  
 
3.2. Measurement issues 
We talked about measurement of public R&D above. Here note that we have measured TFP 
growth and output (Y) in a way consistent with the inclusion of privately generated knowledge in the 
production function. i.e. adjustment of the National Accounts and full growth accounting. Most past 
macro studies do not capitalise R&D into output. Some deal with the issue by subtracting R&D 
personnel from the employment data and implicitly do not adjust output by only considering the non-
knowledge part of output (although in principal one should also adjust capital used in R&D as well). 
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In practice, this mostly means that a regression of non-output adjusted TFP growth on R&D will 
estimate both private and social returns. 
This approach uses lagged RPUB /Y as a regressor. Guellec and von Pottelsburgh (2001) instead 
use log changes in the stock of public knowledge, which is equivalent if such public knowledge does 
not depreciate. The problem with the stock approach is that one has to specify both a depreciation 
rates and a starting value. Thus we stick to the flow approach for public knowledge here. We report 
experiments with longer lags in case it is felt that knowledge takes time to disseminate. 
We clearly have to capture the different parts of RPUB and the elements of Z above. To do this 
we have data on RPUB split into research councils, HEFCE, civil and defence and we shall examine 
these together and separately. We also control for other Z factors by measuring the fraction of the 
population on the internet and the fraction on broadband, the gap between the US (the frontier 
country) and the UK to represent possible learning opportunities and foreign spending on 
government R&D.  
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4. REGRESSION ANALYSIS/FINDINGS 
4.1. Production spillovers and network effects from intangible investment 
The table below sets out our estimates of spillovers from market sector intangible investment.  
 
TABLE 3 
SPILLOVERS FROM INTANGIBLE INVESTMENT 
(Dependent variable: market sector ΔlnTFP, including intangibles, excluding intangibles and 
smoothed as indicated) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFP growth 
including 
intangibles
TFP growth 
including 
intangibles
TFP growth 
including 
intangibles
TFP growth 
excluding 
intangibles
TFP growth 
excluding 
intangibles
TFP growth 
including 
intangibles
VARIABLES smoothed smoothed
DlnH 0.31 0.28 0.079 0.088 1.52
(1.99) (2.90) (0.38) (0.39) (2.22)
DlnK(tan) -0.50 -0.31 -0.13 -0.36
(-1.66) (-1.24) (-0.64) (-1.46)
DlnK(soft) -0.19 -0.073 -0.080 -0.030
(-0.81) (-0.43) (-0.49) (-0.16)
DlnK(ecom) 0.30 0.54 -0.14 0.038
(0.62) (1.51) (-0.38) (0.072)
DlnK(innovp) 0.33 -0.38 -0.19
(0.33) (-0.44) (-0.27)
DlnK(innovp x RD) -0.037
(-0.074)
DlnK(R&D) 0.37 0.038
(0.75) (0.13)
R&D/Y (t-1) 0.65
(0.19)
DlnL -1.36
(-1.71)
Observations 19 19 19 19 19 19
R-squared 0.336 0.246 0.432 0.017 0.019 0.489  
 
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. DlnH is change in log hours worked. DlnK is change in log capital 
stock of, as indicated, tangibles, software, economic competencies (market sector R&D, design, product 
development in financial services), economics competencies excluding market sector R&D, market sector 
R&D, R&D/Y where Y is output including capitalised software and DlnL is change in log labour quality.  
 
Column 1 simply regresses (unsmoothed) ΔlnTFP including intangibles on hours (as a cyclical 
control) and a split of the inputs into, respectively, tangible capital, then intangible capital, split into 
software, economic competencies, and innovative property. None of these ΔlnN terms are remotely 
significant. Column 2 uses smoothed TFP growth (including intangibles) with similar findings. 
Column 3 breaks out innovative property into scientific R&D and the rest of innovative property. The 
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purpose of this is to see if there is any evidence that the inclusion of R&D in the innovative property 
term in column 1 obscures possible spillovers from R&D. Again no significant effect. Columns 4 and 
5 explore this further with just including the change in the R&D stock and then the (lagged) R&D to 
output ratio, again neither are significant. Column 6 is the same as column 1 but also includes a 
labour quality term (that is, the change in hours for occupation/age/gender cells weighted by their 
wage bill shares). The results do not change significantly. 
To check robustness, we also estimated the same equations using further lags of intangible 
capital stocks (up to 4 lags). Once again we find no significant effects. We also tried instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation with (1) lagged capital as instruments and (2) US intangible capital data as 
instruments. The usual overidentifying restrictions tests holds and our main result of no significant 
spillover effects holds. 
What is the interpretation of these results? They suggest no tangible or intangible spillovers 
from private sector investment at the market sector level. For the tangible and software intangible 
category, this is in line with results for the US in Stiroh (2002). For the non-R&D intangible 
categories, these are, to the best of our knowledge, new results. For the R&D intangible category the 
following is worth noting. First, since R&D is capitalised the private returns are not included in TFP 
growth. Thus our results do suggest private returns to private sector R&D (around 20 per cent), but 
no significant social returns.  
Our results in columns 1 to 4 differ from other macro level studies. Past literature, such as 
Guellec and van Pottelsberge (2001), regress traditionally measured TFP growth on R&D. In 
standard National Accounts aggregates R&D will not have been treated as an asset and so will also 
not have an associated capital income flow. This means that the relation between R&D and 
traditionally measured TFP growth will capture both the private return and any spillovers, if they 
exist. In order to identify spillovers it is necessary to ensure that the private return to R&D is not 
captured in TFP growth. To do this requires a recalculation of National Accounts aggregates treating 
R&D as an asset. The data we use does exactly that.  
Second, in column 4 and 5 we get closer to previous studies by regressing ΔlnTFP without 
capitalising R&D on R&D. We obtain a positive coefficient, suggesting a private and social return of 
65 per cent (column 5), but nothing of statistical significance, suggesting no statistically significant 
net spillovers from private R&D to the private sector. Our data suggested a private return to R&D of 
20 per cent. 
The following points are worth noting. First, 85 per cent of private sector R&D is concentrated 
in manufacturing, which is itself now only 12 per cent of value added. Thus with manufacturing 
shrinking, it may be extremely hard to find spillover effects from market sector data (note that 
intangible spending is much more dispersed in manufacturing and services so this argument does not 
apply). Second, as mentioned above in the public civil spending area, much of the private sector 
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R&D is in defence and pharmaceuticals, which are hard to measure sectors. Third, and related many 
of the results on spillovers use industry level data and our economy-wide data may be too crude to 
capture these effects. All the studies cited in Jones and Williams (2002), for example are industry 
level, namely Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984b), Terleckyj (1980), Scherer (1982) Griliches (1994) 
and Sveikauskas (1981). Indeed, in Cameron’s (1996) survey of 60 studies of the rate of return to 
R&D, only one (Grilliches, 1973) is at the total economy level. Indeed the only major recent 
aggregate study we are aware of is Guellec and van Pottelsberge (2001) but their data runs 1980-98 
and covers countries with larger manufacturing sectors.9  
Finally, note that O’Mahony and Vecchi (2009), who estimate spillover effects from R&D, 
human capital (skills) and brand equity (advertising) for a large panel of companies across the 
OECD, find evidence of spillovers from R&D and human capital for R&D intensive sectors but only 
from human capital for non-R&D companies. When they spilt the sample into manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing they find evidence of spillovers from R&D and human capital for manufacturing 
firms but no evidence of spillovers for non-manufacturing firms. They also find no evidence of 
spillovers among the European countries (UK, Germany, France).  
 
 
                                                     
 
9 Specifically, Guellec and van Pottelsburgh (2004), using macro data for OECD economies do find a 
significant effect of R&D/Y on TFP growth pooling across all countries, 1981-98. However, using their data 
set provided with the paper a regression just for the UK of TFP growth on business R&D/Y (and Δlog 
employment) returns a coefficient of 2.11 (t=0.85). So our results are consistent with this.  
 4.2. Spillovers from public R&D  
We next consider spillovers from public sector R&D. 
TABLE 4 
SPILLOVERS FROM PUBLIC R&D 
(Dependent variable, market sector TFP growth) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
TFP 
growth 
including 
intangibles
TFP 
growth 
including 
intangibles
TFP 
growth 
including 
intangibles
TFP 
growth 
including 
intangibles
TFP 
growth 
including 
intangibles
TFP 
growth 
including 
intangibles
(Res+HEF+Civ+Def)/Y (t-1) -1.82
(-1.09)
Res Coun R&D/Y (t-1) 30.1 35.4 23.6
(3.38) (4.00) (3.06)
HEFC/Y (t-1) 9.66
(0.68)
Civil/Y (t-1) -3.99
(-0.38)
Defence/Y (t-1) -1.41
(-0.45)
ln(ALP_US/ALP_UK) -0.42
(-2.18)
Foreign Govt R&D/Y 0.14
(1.93)
Dinternet 0.00036
(0.79)
Res Coun R&D/Y (t-2) 33.6
(2.77)
Res Coun R&D/Y (t-3) 24.4
(1.82)
Observations 17 17 17 17 17 16
R-squared 0.083 0.496 0.479 0.709 0.333 0.159  
 
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. Variables are R&D spending by Research Councils, HEFCE (that 
part of university support that is apportioned to research in universities), Civil and Defence. Foreign Govt is the 
Publicly funded R&D/Y ratio in the non-UK G7 countries, weighted by PPP incomes per head. 
Ln(ALP_US/ALP_UK) is the log of labour productivity in the US relative to the UK, from OECD. Dintenet is 
the change in the share of UK households connected to the internet. TFP growth is smoothed, using TFP data 
that includes private spending on intangibles, from Giorgio Marrano, Haskel and Wallis (2009). The subscripts 
t-1, t-2 and t-3 indicate lags of one, two and three years. Years are 1988-2004, except last column which is 
1989-2004, since the research councils data starts in 1986. 
 
As we have seen, public sector R&D is broken into a number of categories. In column 1 we 
regress TFP growth on the sum of all categories and find no statistically significant effect. Column 2 
enters the breakdown: research council, HEFCE, civil and defence. Even though they are rather 
collinear, there is no significant effect from the HEFCE, Civil of Defence. Column 3 shows the 
results of regressing TFP growth on research council spending alone. The estimated coefficient is 
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very high, suggesting a very large spillover from this spending to market sector TFP growth and the 
coefficient is significant.10 
Column 4 then adds in other Z variables that might help explain TFP growth. They are, 
respectively, productivity levels of US relative to the UK, on the basis that gap with leader shows 
potentially knowledge stock to obtain, foreign government R&D/GDP weighted by relative GDP. 
Dinternet is change in fraction of consumers with an internet connection, which grew very sharply 
over the late 1990s. When adding these additional explanatory variables the effect of research council 
spending remains.11  
Finally we were concerned that the impact of research council spending might take longer then 
one year and so columns 5 and 6 present estimates with research council spending lagged by two and 
three periods. As can be seen our results are robust to increasing the number of lags. . 
We carried out a number of other checks. First, we also added all the DlnK terms in table 3 to 
column 3 of table 4, but the none of them were significant. Second, we added to DlnK(R&D), the 
stock of market sector R&D and market sector R&D/Y (lagged) but neither were significant, whereas 
the Research Council/Y(t-1) term remained so. Third, we experimented with the proportion of 
households on broadband and different measures of the international gap, such as relative TFP, but 
the Research Council/Y(t-1) term remained significant. Fourth, we experimented with different TFP 
growth measures, unsmoothed and the EUKLEMS market sector TFP growth measure from the 
EUKLEMS data, but, again this did not affect the significance of the Research Council/Y(t-1) term.  
One might of course worry about reverse causation in the above results. We have no natural 
experiment in our data, although it would hard to devise one: the experiment of variation in support 
across different geographical areas for example, does not work here since knowledge flows across 
borders. Our lagged results are, we believe of note. It is of course possible that reverse causation is at 
work, namely that increased private sector TFP growth endogenously caused government to raise 
public sector TFP growth, but with our lags of two and three years, it would have to be that the 
anticipation of increased TFP growth in two or three years time would have to raise TFP growth now.  
Finally, we wanted to investigate further the high estimated marginal effect of Research 
Council/Y(t-1). A natural hypothesis is that this marginal effect is large since funding was 
comparatively low over most of the period. The most natural way to examine this is to include the 
most recent years since 2004 since this is the very large rise in spending (see Figure 2). To do this we 
                                                     
 
10 Individual regressions of the other components of public R&D gives similar results to column 2. That is, 
other components of public R&D spending, entered separately, are not found to have a significant effect on 
market sector TFP growth.  
11 We also tried, without affecting the sign or statistical significance of the research council coefficient terms 
for unions (coverage and density), adding non-linear effects of research council spend and public capital stock 
(buildings, transport). We then broke the research council term into those parts consistently available, that is 
spend by the MRC, SERC/EPSRC and ESRC, but these were too collinear to obtain any well specified results. 
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have had to update our TFP growth calculations which we have done in Haskel et al (2009) (note that 
the latest revision by the ONS of calculating financial services, a volatile and important sector, makes 
the updating a large task). The results are set out in Table 5  
 
 
TABLE 5 
MARGINAL EFFECTS OF RESEARCH COUNCIL SPENDING 
(Dependent variable, market sector TFP growth) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFP growth 
including 
intangibles
TFP growth 
including 
intangibles
TFP growth 
including 
intangibles
TFP growth 
including 
intangibles
VARIABLES 1988-2004 1988-2005 1988-2006 1988-2007
Res Coun R&D/Y (t-1) 27.2 23.3 15.0 12.7
(3.36) (3.28) (2.33) (2.63)
Observations 17 18 19 20
R-squared 0.398 0.382 0.284 0.272  
 
Which presents estimates of the spillover effect from research council spending for 4 different time 
periods. Column 1 uses the original time period, but using the new TFP data to 2007. We obtain a 
similar significant result, but with a somewhat smaller coefficient. The main point however is shown 
in row 1: as we extend the time period during which Research council spending is very rapidly 
expanding, the marginal effect falls, being 12.7 when including the most recent period.  
 
4.3. Discussion of results 
First, given current pressure on public finances there is clearly a need to focus Government 
support for innovation in areas where the impact is likely to be largest. We believe our findings point 
in a specific direction for Government innovation support. Our results tentatively suggest that 
government innovation policy should focus on direct spending on innovation, specifically funding for 
research councils, rather than through tax incentives to firms.  
Second, we do find a high rate of return on research council spending, although diminishing 
strongly, consistent with the idea that for much of the period public support for this research has been 
comparatively low. It is worth noting that the UK science base is also usually found to be world class 
(see e.g. Bruneel, D’Eeste, Neely and Salter, 2009) in a number of dimensions, and given that the 
research supported by research councils is freely available and likely to be basic science, the spillover 
effects should be very high. Note that private R&D is reported from the BERD to be around 33 per 
cent basic and 66 per cent applied, and one might expect few spillovers from applied work, that is, 
putting a particular idea into productive form. There is some support for high university spillovers; 
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Guellec and van Pottelsberge (2004) find a positive impact of public sector R&D (measured by R&D 
performed in government labs and universities) on market sector TFP growth. They also find that this 
impact is positively affected by the share of universities (contrary to government labs) in research 
and negatively affected by the share of defence in public R&D budgets.  
Third, turning to Civil and Defence R&D, as discussed above, the lack of spillover effects here 
could reflect a true lack of spillovers, due e.g. to secrecy in defence R&D, or could be a result of 
measurement problems, such as mismeasurement of health output or defence being too small to pick 
up in our market sector data. In addition, social reasons for investing in defence are likely not well 
picked up by market sector output per person. All this suggests that more forensic work is required to 
better understand just what such R&D data consists of and what projects it is likely spent on.  
Finally, consider our findings of no spillovers from market sector intangible investment. The 
existing literature on such spillovers has only looked at R&D (on which there is a large literature) 
and on spillovers from software (e.g. Stiroh, 2002, who looks for spillovers from hardware and 
software combined). Stiroh (2002) finds no spillovers from software. The aggregate studies on R&D 
typically find no effect, although the disaggregated studies do find such an effect. Our aggregate 
finding does not imply that there are not spillover effects at the industry or firm level but that these 
do not appear to be significant in a macroeconomic sense. This has implications for measures such as 
the R&D tax credit. Firstly, our results suggest that the R&D tax credit should not be expanded to 
cover a broader range of intangible assets. Secondly, our results suggest that although the R&D tax 
credit is likely to have a beneficial impact on specific sectors of the economy, due to the industry 
level spillovers evident in past literature, there appears to be no evidence of market sector level 
spillovers. For the UK this is likely to be due to the small size of R&D intensive sectors, concentrated 
in manufacturing, relative to the entire market sector. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Using a dataset on market sector productivity, intangible assets and public sector R&D this 
paper looks for evidence on spillovers from intangible investment and market sector productivity 
benefits from public R&D. The empirical results suggest no evidence of spillover effects from 
intangible investment at the market sector level, including R&D. The result for R&D differs from 
much of the past literature but the majority of that literature focuses on industry or firm level 
spillovers rather that market sector level. We argue that our finding is more robust than those 
macroeconomic studies that do exist because we fully re-estimate National Accounts aggregate to 
take account of the treatment of R&D as a capital asset, thus fully removing from measured TFP 
private returns to capital.12 
 We find strong evidence of market sector productivity benefits from public spending on 
research councils with a very high, but diminishing, estimated rate of return. We find no evidence of 
market sector spillovers from public spending on civil or defence R&D 
Taken together these findings tentatively suggest that in a world of constrained fiscal spending 
government innovation policy should focus on direct spending on innovation, specifically research 
councils, rather than through tax incentives, such as the R&D tax credit, to firms.13  
These findings are of course based on a relatively small number of observations. Future work 
could of course use better data and better measures e.g. of health output in evaluating publicly 
financed health R&D. But given the paucity of evidence on such an important question, we think the 
findings here are worth reporting and will hopefully spur more work and better data. 
 
                                                     
 
12 Although our findings are of course subject to the usual criticisms of data etc. In this case, our data is eerily 
reminiscent of Griliches (1979) discussion of the difficulties of using time series data to examine the 
contribution of NASA R&D to the US economy “…we are faced with the fact that at the aggregate level we 
have only one cycle to work with: a rapid and continuous rise in NASA's R&D expenditures to the mid-1960s 
and then a more or less continuous decline to the mid-1970s.” Our research council data consist of a rise in the 
early 1990s, a decline in the mid 1990s and a sharp rise again.  
13 Finally, in the 2009 Pre-Budget Report, £600m of cuts were announced to higher education, from which we 
should be able to use our coefficients to work out the impact on private sector growth. At time of writing, there 
is no information currently on the impact on research councils. The most detailed information is on how £449 
million of cuts will be made to HEFCE in 2010-11, and that such cuts will mainly fall on capital spend and 
teaching. 
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